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Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120002-1

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INTELLIGENCE DATA FOR BACKGROUND USE
IN DEVELOPING THE GROUND FORCE PORTION OF
AN INTERNATIONAL MILITARY INSPECTION AND
SUPERVISION SYSTEM.

Prepared jointly by

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE
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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

QUESTIONS:

- I. What are the strategic localities within Soviet Russia or its Satellite countries from which (a) conventional attacks (air and ground) of significant proportions and (b) nuclear attacks might be launched?
- II. What would be the specific preliminary indications of a Soviet intention (1) to mount a devastating attack, either conventional or nuclear or both, (2) to use standing armament without warning or, (3) otherwise, to act in bad faith? At what points should observers be posted to best search out such indications?
- III. What are the key military areas, installations and facilities and industrial establishments within Soviet Russia and its European Satellite countries which, if carefully observed would provide substantial evidence of an impending offensive effort by (a) conventional (air and ground), and (b) nuclear means?
- IV. What measures have been noted or might be anticipated whereby the USSR might seek to obscure the real strength and disposition of existing conventional forces and to conceal nuclear resources and activities?
- V. What special equipment or detection devices would aid in securing indications of attack in both the conventional and nuclear fields?
- VI. Assuming that preparations for a surprise attack had been consummated prior to the introduction of the inspection system, how might these best be discovered?

APPENDIXES:

- A. Key Transportation Centers
- B. Key Munitions Storage Locations
- C. Centers of Control
- D. Industrial Facilities
- E. State Reserve at Bases of the Main Administration of
State Material Reserves

INTRODUCTION

This study contains material arranged as answers to specific questions raised by General L. K. Truscott, Jr., in a memorandum of 20 September 1955, to the Director, Central Intelligence. These questions relate to the Ground Force portion of an inspection system designed for the purpose of limiting the chances for signatory nations to mount surprise attacks and of providing an effective early warning system.

A program of inspection designed for the purpose of limiting the chances for signatory nations to mount surprise attacks and for providing an effective early warning system must insure the collection and timely exploitation of substantial amounts of information in addition to what is available to the US intelligence community under present circumstances. Pertinent information would be related to and derived from activities of the armed forces themselves, in support of these armed forces, industrial activity on behalf of the military services and many other supporting or correlated activities. The study is directed specifically at those activities relating directly to the Soviet Ground Forces. It incorporates details concerning specific activities, locations at which such activities can be expected to occur, and an analysis of those activities as they relate to an impending attack or are indications of the increasing likelihood of the imminence of hostilities.

In addition to those aspects dealing with early warning of surprise attack, the study enumerates a substantial number of activities and places about which additional information would be necessary in the conduct of an inspection program to supervise compliance with commitments or obligations accepted under an arms reduction or disarmament program. These relate to the more basic economic structure and cannot be as sharply focussed to reveal activities unique to preparations for war. They fall into a category relating to the normal civilian economy and only the ultimate destination of the product, or the end user, will reveal their specific relation to military preparations.

The request for this data did not specify the nature of the inspection program being considered, so the study has been prepared as background against which, firstly, to judge the nature of the problem and its magnitude, secondly, to assist in determining which activities can be most specifically related to preparations for attack, and finally, to exercise the selectivity necessary in determining which activities must be checked in order to achieve an acceptable compromise between the need for information on which to base an accurate estimate of the situation and the practical limitations of the inspecting force which can be utilized.

Question I. What are the strategic localities within Soviet Russia or its satellite countries from which (a) conventional attacks (air and ground) of significant proportions and (b) nuclear attacks might be launched?

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1. The best available estimates conclude that Soviet strategy in the event of war is likely to be based upon a rapid overrunning of potentially hostile areas of Europe in order to neutralize Allied bases and provide maximum defense in depth against attack, prevent the build-up of US forces in areas from which they could threaten the Soviet Union and gain egress from the Baltic and Black Seas.

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
Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120002-1

Next 6 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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Question II. What would be the specific preliminary indications of a Soviet intention (1) to mount a devastating attack, either conventional or nuclear or both, (2) to use standing armament without warning or, (3) otherwise, to act in bad faith? At what points should observers be posted to best search out such indications?

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
Next 23 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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Question III. What are the key military areas, installations and facilities, and industrial establishments within Soviet Russia and its European Satellites which, if carefully observed, would provide substantial evidence of an impending offensive effort by (1) conventional (air and ground) and (2) nuclear means?

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1. There are a large number of key military areas, industrial establishments, storage and transportation facilities, and centers of control in the Soviet Bloc which might provide substantial evidence of an impending attack. The discussion which follows describes the principal types of military and economic activity which probably would be most fruitful in an inspection effort. It must be pointed out that most of these activities are necessarily more long-run in nature than those discussed in the answers to Questions I and II. Detailed discussions of the reasons and benefits of including these



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Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120002-1

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120002-1

Question IV. What measures have been noted or might be anticipated
whereby the USSR might seek to obscure the real strength
and disposition of existing conventional forces and to
conceal nuclear resources and activities?

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
Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120002-1

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120002-1

Question V. What special equipment or detection devices would aid
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ventional and nuclear fields?

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V-1

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Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120002-1

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120002-1

Question VI. Assuming that preparations for a surprise attack
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the inspection system, how might these best be
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VI-1

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Next 13 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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